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Abstract
An interesting feature of pollution permit markets is that citizens may purchase permits to
directly lower the levels of pollution. Kwerel's mechanism (Review of Economic
Studies~1977) is not incentive compatible when citizens demand permits. We show that a
modification of Kwerel's mechainism, the minimum-price mechanism, is incentive
compatible when citizens demand permits, even in the case where there is uncertainty about
the damages from pollution.
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Kwerel (1977) presents a mechanism for pollution control that utilizes a competitive pollution
permit market. In his model, the damage from pollution is common knowledge, but the
¯rms' abatement costs are private information. The government asks the ¯rms to submit
their abatement costs and uses their responses to determine two parameters of the pollution
permit market. The ¯rst parameter is the endowment of permits and the second parameter
is a subsidy for reducing pollution below the number of permits held. Under the assumptions
of his model, Kwerel's mechanism is strictly incentive compatible|¯rms have the incentive
to tell the truth about their abatement costs. Although subsequent authors (Dasgupta
et al. 1980, Lewis and Sappington 1995) analyze more general mechanisms for pollution
control, Kwerel's mechanism retains prominence in the environmental economics literature
and is often featured in textbook presentations (Kolstad 2000, Goodstein 2002).
Kwerel implicitly assumes that pollution permits trade only among the ¯rms. A number
of recent papers, however, consider the possibility that citizens harmed by pollution may
participate in permit markets.1 In these markets, citizens buy and \retire" permits to lower
the quantity of pollution. Although the endowment of pollution permits is determined by
the government, the actions of ¯rms and citizens in the market determine the actual level of
pollution.
We analyze the e®ects of citizens' demand for permits on Kwerel's mechanism. In our
basic model, the information structure is the same as in Kwerel's model, but we add a demand
for permits from citizens. Due to citizens' demand, Kwerel's mechanism is no longer incentive
compatible. We then consider a modi¯cation of his mechanism, which we call the minimum-
price mechanism. The government uses the same rule as Kwerel's mechanism to select
the endowment of permits. But rather than giving a subsidy for pollution reduction, the
government enforces a minimum price. The minimum-price mechanism is strictly incentive
compatible.
We also consider an extension to the basic model in which damages from pollution are
no longer common knowledge. Rather, the government has probabilistic beliefs about the
damages from pollution and ¯rms have probabilistic beliefs about the citizens' demand.
Under general conditions on these beliefs, the minimum-price mechanism is weakly incentive
compatible. If we add an extra condition relating the ¯rms' beliefs to the government's
beliefs, however, the minimum-price mechanism becomes strictly incentive compatible.
2 The Basic Model and Mechanisms
Following Kwerel's model and notation, let X be total emissions of pollution. Damage
as a function of emissions is denoted by D(X) and is common knowledge to citizens, the
government, and ¯rms. The ¯rst derivative D0 and the second derivative D00 are both positive.
The government selects the endowment of permits L and other parameters as described
1Boyd and Conley (1997) and Conley and Smith (2005) consider markets in which citizens are charged
personalized prices. Markets in which citizens are charged a common price are analyzed by Guha (1996),
Ahlheim and Schneider (2002), Shrestha (1998), Smith and Yates (2003), and Malueg and Yates (2006).
Israel (2005) documents the degree to which citizens actually retire permits in the EPA's acid rain program.
1below. Following Kwerel, we assume that the government does not grandfather any permits
to the ¯rms (or the citizens for that matter) and the permit market is competitive. One
interpretation of this structure is that the government auctions all permits and the rules of
the auction are constructed such that it yields the competitive price.2 Let p be the price of
permits.
There are many polluting ¯rms. Each ¯rm has an abatement cost function which is
private information. In the permit market each ¯rm selects permit holdings such that it's
individual marginal abatement cost is equal to the price of permits. It follows that the
marginal abatement costs are equal across all ¯rms. Without loss of generality, then, we
need only consider the aggregate abatement cost function3, which we denote by C(X). The
¯rst derivative C0 is negative and second derivative C00 is positive. The e±cient level of
pollution is the value X¤ that satis¯es D0(X¤) = ¡C0(X¤).
Our basic model is constructed by adding a demand for permits from citizens to Kwerel's
model. Let R be the quantity of permit purchases by citizens. At ¯rst we assume that




D(L ¡ R) + pR
such that R ¸ 0:
The market price determines whether the constraint is binding. If p ¸ D0(L), then citizens
are \priced out" of the market and their demand is zero. The marginal damage at the
endowment of permits is less than the price and so permits are too expensive to retire. If
p < D0(L), then citizens' demand is determined by the ¯rst-order condition
p = D0(L ¡ R): (1)
Citizens buy permits until the marginal damage at the level of pollution L ¡ R is equal to
the price.
In a mechanism, the government asks the ¯rms to report their abatement cost functions.
Based on their responses, the government determines the structure of the pollution permit
market in which ¯rms and citizens purchase permits. The ¯rms know how the government
is going to use the information that the ¯rms report. Let the reported aggregate abatement
cost function be denoted by ^ C(X).
We now present the two mechanisms and give a brief intuitive discussion of their prop-
erties. Formal propositions are given below.
Kwerel mechanism. The government issues an endowment of permits L. It also pays a
subsidy e per permit held in excess of emissions. The government selects the parameters L
and e such that D0(L) = ¡ ^ C0(L) = e:
The government selects the permit endowment such that marginal damage is equal to re-
ported marginal abatement cost. The subsidy is equal to the value of marginal damage
2In the minimum-price mechanism, the auction must yield the competitive price or the minimum price,
whichever is greater.






2at this endowment. Suppose for the moment, as Kwerel implicitly does, that there is no
demand from citizens. If ¯rms understate their abatement costs, then the government issues
a small endowment of permits, and thus the market price of permits will be high. If ¯rms
overstate their abatement costs, then the government issues a large endowment of permits,
but the market price of permits will be high because of the subsidy. Firms can obtain the
lowest price by telling the truth. This result does not hold, however, when we account for
demand from citizens. Loosely speaking, the subsidy induces citizens to purchase too many
permits. Because of this, the ¯rms understate their abatement costs.
To be incentive compatible, a mechanism must keep the price of permits high when
¯rms overstate their costs. Kwerel's mechanism uses a subsidy, but this entices citizens to
purchase too many permits. The trick is to keep the price high without inducing citizens
into the market. The government can do this by enforcing a minimum price in the permit
market.
Minimum-price mechanism. The government issues an endowment of permits L. It also
enforces a minimum price ¹ p in the permit market. The government selects the parameters L
and ¹ p such that D0(L) = ¡ ^ C0(L) = ¹ p
The endowment of permits is set as in the Kwerel Mechanism and the minimum price is equal
to marginal damage at the endowment of permits. Under the minimum-price mechanism,
¯rms tell the truth.
3 No Citizen Demand
In this section we brie°y review the details of Kwerel's result under the assumption that
there is no demand from citizens. Rather than directly stating Kwerel's theorem, we state a
proposition based on the key step in the proof of his theorem. This facilitates comparisons
with the minimum-price mechanism. Let p(L) be the equilibrium price of permits as a
function of the permit endowment.
Proposition 1. Suppose that there is no demand from citizens, and the government uses
the Kwerel mechanism. Then p(L) attains a strict global minimum at X¤.
With this proposition in hand, we are only a corollary or two away from Kwerel's theorem.
Because each ¯rm's total cost (abatement cost plus permit expenditures) is increasing in p,
it follows that each ¯rm's total costs are minimized when the government picks L = X¤. If
every other ¯rm reports their true abatement costs, then the best strategy for a given ¯rm
is to report their true abatement costs. As stated by Kwerel, telling the truth is a Nash
equilibrium.
4 Citizen Demand
In this section, we present formal results for the two mechanisms under the assumption that
citizens do have a demand for permits.
First consider the Kwerel mechanism. Because citizens do not generate emissions, they
obtain the subsidy for every permit purchased. So their e®ective price for permits is p ¡ e.
3(The government could try to prevent citizens from obtaining the subsidy, but such e®orts
are costly.) If
¡C0(L) ¸ D0(L) + e: (2)
then the permit endowment is such that, at the endowment, the value of permits to ¯rms
is greater than value of permits to citizens. Thus citizens are priced out of market and
p = ¡C0(L). On the other hand, if, at the endowment, the value of permits to citizens is
greater than the value of permits to ¯rms then both ¯rms and citizens purchase permits.
The equilibrium quantity of pollution is found at the intersection of D0(X)+e and ¡C0(X).
So the market price and equilibrium quantity of pollution are determined by
D0(X) + e ¡ C0(X) = p: (3)
In equilibrium, citizens retire R = L ¡ X permits.
The following proposition delineates the e®ect of citizens' demand on the Kwerel mech-
anism. (All proofs are in the Appendix.)
Proposition 2. Suppose that citizens have a demand for permits, and the government uses
the Kwerel mechanism. Then there exists a Lk (with Lk < X¤), such that p(L) attains a
strict global minimum at Lk.
Because p(L) attains a strict global minimum at a value less than the e±cient level, ¯rms
have an incentive to understate their costs. The problem is the subsidy induces citizens to
purchase more permits than they otherwise would. This drives the price up, which hurts
¯rms. The best strategy for ¯rms is to understate costs so that citizens are just priced out
of the market.
Next we consider the minimum-price mechanism. The citizens are priced out of the
market in this mechanism, as the market price is greater than or equal to the minimum price,
which in turn is equal to marginal damage at the permit endowment. If ¯rms understate,
the market price is high. If ¯rms overstate, the market price is also high because of the
minimum price. Firms obtain the lowest price by telling the truth.
Proposition 3. Suppose that citizens have a demand for permits, and the government uses
the minimum-price mechanism. Then p(L) attains a strict global minimum at X¤.
5 Uncertain Damages
In this section, we relax the assumption that the damage function is common knowledge by
de¯ning probabilistic beliefs for the ¯rms and the government. We also allow for free-riding
by citizens.
Firms care about damages only insofar as these damages lead to a demand for permits by
citizens. So the ¯rms' beliefs should be de¯ned with respect to this demand, or more primi-
tively, the function that generates this demand. To keep the analysis tractable, we assume
that the all ¯rms have identical beliefs. Accordingly, let the ¯rms' beliefs be summarized
by the function E(X;"), where " is a random variable. In other words, ¯rms believe the
4citizens' demand for permits is determined by
min
R
E(L ¡ R;") + pR
such that R ¸ 0:
The function E obviously accounts for uncertainty about the severity of damages from pollu-
tion. But it also accounts for uncertainty about the degree of free-riding by citizens, because
the degree of free-riding in°uences the citizens' demand for permits. Because of free-riding,
then, ex. post actual damages are not necessarily equal to E. As usual, we assume E has
positive ¯rst and second derivatives with respect to X.
For the government, it is su±cient to specify an expected damage function K(X) (with
K0 > 0 and K00 > 0). The government announces this function to the ¯rms and citizens.
Even in the absence of free-riding, the government may have di®erent beliefs about damages
than the ¯rms. So we do not require the expected value of E(X;") to be equal to K(X).
The parameters L and ¹ p in the minimum-price mechanism are determined such that
K0(L) = ¡ ^ C0(L) = ¹ p. The analysis depends on the relationship between the ¯rms' aggregate
marginal abatement cost, the government's expected marginal damage, and the citizens'
function E. Figure 1 illustrates these functions for a particular realization ² of ". It also
illustrates two critical price and pollution pairs. We interpret po as the market price that
would prevail in the absence of a price minimum, provided L is su±ciently large. It is de¯ned
as po = ¡C0(Xo), where Xo solves ¡C0(Xo) = E0(Xo;²). We interpret ~ p as the government's
expected price for permits in the absence of citizen participation, provided ¯rms tell the
truth. It is de¯ned as ~ p = ¡C0( ~ X), where ~ X solves ¡C0( ~ X) = K0( ~ X).
The next proposition delineates the properties of the minimum-price mechanism with
uncertain damages.
Proposition 4. Suppose that citizens have a demand for permits, the government uses the
minimum-price mechanism, and the damages are uncertain to the government and ¯rms.
Then for any ² such that po < ~ p, the price function p(L) attains a strict global minimum at
~ X. For any ² such that p0 ¸ ~ p, the price function p(L) attains a global minimum at ~ X.
Proposition 4 is stated with respect to a single realization ². We must consider the entire
distribution of the random variable " to determine the expected total costs for ¯rms. But
it follows directly from Proposition 4 that L = ~ X is a minimum of expected total costs for
each of the ¯rms.4 Thus the minimum-price mechanism is weakly incentive compatible.
If we impose an extra condition relating the ¯rms' beliefs to the government's beliefs,
then the minimum-price mechanism is strictly incentive compatible. Suppose there exists a
realization ² of " such that po < ~ p. Then for this ², by Proposition 6, L = ~ X leads to a
strict minimum of total costs. For any other ², by Proposition 6, L = ~ X leads to at least a
minimum of total costs. Thus L = ~ X leads to a strict minimum of expected total costs. To
understand why the extra condition is required, suppose for the moment that relationship
between E0(X;²) and K0(X) shown in Figure 1 holds for every ², so that the extra condition
4The market price is, in general, a function of L and ². Firm j0s total costs are given by Tj(p(L;²)) =
minxj cj(xj) + p(L;²)xj. Because Tj is increasing in p, Proposition 4 implies that Tj(p( ~ X;²)) · Tj(p(L;²))
for each ² and each L.
5is not satis¯ed. Then an endowment of ~ X leads to a minimum of total expected costs, but
so does any value slightly greater (but not too great so that the minimum-price constraint
starts to bind) and so does any value slightly smaller (but not too small such that citizens
are priced out of the market.)
6 Conclusion
When damages are common knowledge, the minimum-price mechanism not only induces
¯rms to tell the truth, but leads to the e±cient amount of pollution as well. When damages
are uncertain, the mechanism does not usually lead to e±ciency. This raises the interest-
ing possibility that the government could improve welfare by understating or overstating
expected marginal damages K(X). To determine the welfare maximizing function K(X),
one must specify the government's beliefs about marginal abatement costs, the damage from
pollution, the free-riding of citizens, as well as specify the government's beliefs about the
beliefs of the ¯rms about the demand for permits. We leave such an analysis to further work.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Equation (2) gives the condition for citizens to be priced out of the
market. Now in Kwerel's mechanism, e = D0(L). So (2) becomes
¡C0(L) ¸ 2D0(L)
Let Lk be the value of L that satis¯es this equation with equality. For L = Lk we have
p = ¡C0(Lk). We also know that Lk < X¤. (Because ¡C0(Lk) = 2D0(Lk) it follows that
¡C0(Lk) > D0(Lk). Then Lk < X¤ follows from the de¯nition of X¤ and the fact that
D00 > 0 and C00 > 0.)
For L < Lk, the fact that D00 > 0 implies e = D0(L) < D0(LK). Likewise, the fact that
C00 > 0 implies that ¡C0(L) > ¡C0(Lk). So for L < Lk we have
D0(L) + e < 2D0(Lk) = ¡C0(Lk) < ¡C0(L):
It follows that citizens are priced out of the market and we have p = ¡C0(L) > ¡C0(Lk).
Now for L > Lk the fact that D00 > 0 implies that e = D0(L) > D0(Lk). Likewise, fact
that C00 > 0 implies that ¡C0(L) < ¡C0(Lk). So for L > Lk we have
D0(L) + e > 2D0(Lk) = ¡C0(Lk) > ¡C0(L):
It follows that citizens and ¯rms purchase permits and the equilibrium market price is
determined by equation (3). With e = D0(L) equation (3) becomes
D0(X) + D0(L) = ¡C0(X):
Re-arranging yields
¡C0(X) ¡ D0(X) = D0(L): (4)
From the de¯nition of Lk we have
¡C0(Lk) ¡ D0(Lk) = D0(Lk): (5)
6Because D0(L) > D0(Lk), it follows from (4) and (5), as well as D00 > 0 and C00 > 0, that
X < Lk. Now, from (3), we have p = ¡C0(X) and since C00 > 0 we have p = ¡C0(X) >
¡C0(Lk).
In summary, for L < Lk, we have p > ¡C0(Lk). For L > Lk, we have p > ¡C0(Lk). And
for L = Lk we have p = ¡C0(Lk). Thus p(L) attains a strict global minimum at Lk, and as
noted above, Lk < X¤.
Proof of Proposition 3. Citizens are always priced out of the market. Let Lm be the
solution to D0(L) = ¡C0(L). By de¯nition of e±ciency, Lm = X¤. For L = Lm, we have
p = ¹ p = D0(X¤) = ¡C0(X¤).
For L < Lm, we have ¹ p = D0(L) < ¡C0(L). So the equilibrium price has p = ¡C0(L)
and because C00 > 0, we have C0(L) > ¡C0(X¤). Thus p > ¡C0(X¤).
For L > Lm, we have ¹ p = D0(L) > C0(L). So the equilibrium price is equal to the
minimum price. Because D00 > 0 we have ¹ p = D0(L) > D0(X¤) = ¡C0(X¤). So the
equilibrium price is greater than C0(X¤).
Thus p(L) attains a strict global minimum at Lm.
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose ¯rst that for some realization ², it is the case that po < ~ p. Then because C00 > 0
we have Xo > ~ X. We show that p(L) has a strict global minimum at ~ X. First, consider
the case L < ~ X. Because C00 > 0 we have ¡C0(L) > ¡C0( ~ X) = ~ p. Because E00 > 0 we
have ~ p > po = E0(Xo;²) > E0(L;²). Thus it follows that ¡C0(L) > E0(L;²) and citizens
are priced out of the market. By the de¯nition of ~ X, we have ¡C0(L) > K0(L) and so the
minimum price constraint in not binding. So the equilibrium price satis¯es p = ¡C0(L) > ~ p.
Second, consider the case L = ~ X. Following similar arguments to the previous case, citizens
are priced out of the market and the equilibrium price is ~ p. Third, consider the case L > ~ X.
By de¯nition of the minimum price, we have p ¸ ¹ p = K0(L). Because K00 > 0, we have
K0(L) > ~ p. Thus p > ~ p. We conclude that if po < ~ p, then p(L) has a strict global minimum
at L = ~ X.
On the other hand, if po ¸ ~ p, then we have Xo · ~ X. We show that p(L) has a global
minimum, but not necessarily a strict global minimum, at ~ X. First consider the case L · Xo.
Because C00 > 0 and E00 > 0, we have ¡C0(L) > ¡C0(Xo) = E0(Xo;²) > E0(L;²). Thus
citizens are priced out of the market. Likewise, because L < ~ X we have ¡C0(L) > K0(L),
so the minimum price constraint is not binding. So the equilibrium price is given by p =
¡C0(L) ¸ po. Second, consider the case L > Xo. Because E00 > 0, we have E0(L;²) > po. So
citizens will participate in the market for any price at or below po, and hence the equilibrium
price cannot be below po. It will only be greater than po if the minimum price constraint
is strictly binding. This constraint cannot be strictly binding, however, at L = ~ X, because
po ¸ ~ p and ¹ p = K0( ~ X) = ~ p. So for L = ~ X the equilibrium price is po. We conclude that if
po ¸ ~ p then p(L) has a global minimum at ~ X.
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